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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
EXAMINING THE ASSANGE INDICTMENT
Mary-Rose Papandrea*
The following is a transcript of the keynote address given by
Dean Mary-Rose Papandrea at First Amendment Law Review’s
2021 Symposium on National Security, Whistleblowers, and the First
Amendment.1 The virtual event also featured two panels on (1)
Classification and Access to National Security Information2 and (2) The
Press, Whistleblowers, and Government Information Leaks.3
I thought I would set out some of the issues that matter a
lot to me. And I thought we shouldn't get going without thinking
a little bit about the timing of this symposium. I know for some
of you, including some of the panelists, you probably thought,
well, these issues aren't really new. Most of us have been working
on them getting close on to decades now. Multiple decades. The
tension between the need to protect our most sensitive national
security secrets while at the same time trying to promote an
informed democracy is something we've been struggling with for
a very long time. But for me, the attack on the Capitol on January
sixth gave rise to a new urgency to consider how our democracy
works and what doesn't work. I do not take anything for granted.
We have weathered the last four years, a prolonged attack on our
institutions, on all three branches of government, on universities
and, of course, on the press.
As we go forward, we are going to have to start looking
at how we are going to rebuild and heal as a nation. And an
essential part of this rebuilding and healing process will involve
truth and figuring out what is true and what is not true. An
important way of figuring this out is to rely on the press, the
respected members of the media, the journalists who have played
such an important role in this country in making sure that we
* Mary-Rose Papandrea is the Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of
Constitutional Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of
North Carolina School of Law.
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This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity. The editors have also inserted
footnotes throughout the transcript where there are references to specific cases,
statutes, works of scholarship, or other sources.
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Mary-Rose Papandrea, Margaret Kwoka, David Pozen & Stephen I. Vladeck, Panel
One: Classification and Access to National Security Information, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
222 (2021) [hereinafter Panel One].
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David S. Ardia, Heidi Kitrosser, David McCraw, Mary-Rose Papandrea & David
Schulz, Panel Two: The Press, Whistleblowers, and Government Information Leaks, 19
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 253 (2021) [hereinafter Panel Two].
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know what our leaders are doing in our names. I should also add,
truth––this is not just about national security. Of course, racial
justice, the history of white supremacy in this country. We have
a lot to resolve, and the role of the press is going to be important.
I'm going to use the prosecution of Julian Assange as a
lens to view some of the key issues that we as a nation will need
to struggle with going forward. And it is this prosecution and not,
of course, the attack on the Capitol on January sixth that was the
impetus for this symposium. Julian Assange, of course, is the
founder of WikiLeaks. He's Australian. WikiLeaks is an online
platform that's committed to radical transparency. It was
founded in 2006, and it became noticed in the public eye when it
published a series of leaks from Chelsea Manning, a U.S.
intelligence analyst, around 2009.
Julian Assange is a highly polarizing figure. On the one
hand, he has won journalism awards for essentially calling out
truth to power. But he's also been attacked by many on both sides
of the aisle. President Biden, not since he's been president, but in
the past, has referred to him as a high-tech terrorist. It remains to
be seen whether Biden's administration will continue this
prosecution, but we shall see. I will say that the possibility of
prosecuting Julian Assange is something that the Obama
administration seriously considered and ultimately decided
against, fearing that it wouldn't be possible to distinguish the
established press like The New York Times. And they also feared
a First Amendment defeat. The Trump administration, however,
did go forward with prosecuting Assange, and we found out
about it in late 2018.
Since then, there have been two superseding indictments.
The current operating indictment, the second superseding
indictment, has eighteen counts.4 Notably, the indictment
doesn't focus on some of the really problematic publications of
WikiLeaks––for example, the publication of the hacked emails
from the DNC during the 2016 election, believed to have been

4

Press Release, DOJ, WikiLeaks Founder Charged in Superseding Indictment (June
24, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wikileaks-founder-charged-supersedingindictment; see also Charlie Savage, Assange Indicted under Espionage Act, Raising First
Amendment Issues, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/us/politics/assange-indictment.html.
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orchestrated by the Russians.5 Instead, it focuses on thousands
of emails that Chelsea Manning gave them in 2009 and 2010
and, in particular, the publication of some sources, including the
names of some informants.6 The Chelsea Manning trove of
information has thousands and thousands and thousands of
pages of information, and it covered a number of military
operations, including Iraq war logs, Afghan war diaries, and
Afghan war logs.7 One point that's worth noting is that a number
of news outlets also published parts of these leaked materials. So,
that's where it does become particularly difficult to make any
distinction between the publication by WikiLeaks and the
publication from some mainstream media outlets.
Now, in the second superseding indictment, there are
eighteen counts, and a lot of people who dismiss this prosecution
as not posing a big threat to journalists focus on the parts of the
indictment that alleged that there was a conspiracy to commit
computer intrusion––that Julian Assange helped Chelsea
Manning try to crack a password hash stored on the U.S.
Department of Defense computers. And, rightfully, people point
out it is not normal journalistic practice to help sources crack
passwords per se. This was unsuccessful, the attempt to crack.
But what I want to mention and highlight for everyone here is
that the indictment goes much, much further than just talking
about the involvement with hackers and being intimately
involved with getting that information. There are seventeen
other counts.8 And most of these counts are under the Espionage
Act for conspiring to obtain national security information or
even just for simply publishing this national security
information, regardless of how it was obtained.9 These counts
surely do implicate the First Amendment rights of the press.
At present, there are many unresolved First Amendment
issues. First, on the obtaining of the national security
information, national security reporters work very closely with
their sources. Although, as I said, they don't routinely try to help
their sources crack passwords, they certainly will work with
sources and may even encourage them to obtain material when
5

See Second Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Assange, No. 1:18-cr-111 (CMH) (E.D.
Va. June 24, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1289641/download.
6
See id.
7
See id.
8
See id.
9
See id.
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possible. There is a case called Bartnicki, where the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment protected the publication
of sensitive information as long as there were clean hands.10 In
that particular case, a radio station received a tape anonymously,
basically dropped in their mailbox, and they went ahead and
published it.11 The tape was of an intercepted phone call, an
admittedly illegally intercepted phone call.12 The problem with
the Bartnicki case is threefold. Number one, in most situations
you will not have a clean hands defense. Most journalists have
ongoing relationships with their sources, and it's unclear what
would be sufficient to lose that Bartnicki protection. So, in
Bartnicki, there was no involvement whatsoever in the obtaining
of that information from the source.13 But what if, for example,
the reporter said, “here's my email address, send me whatever
you have.” It may take very little to lose that protection.
Secondly, the Bartnicki case is not a national security case.
And I think for any of you who've studied constitutional law,
you know that all bets are off as soon as national security is
involved. This could not be more true than in the First
Amendment context. I'll just cite the Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project14 case as an example of where the Court did not follow its
usual rules and doctrine in the First Amendment context.
Thirdly, it's, of course, very clear that the indictment’s
counts that allege that Assange published national security
secrets would raise the specter that the media, the more
mainstream media, could also be prosecuted for the same thing.
We have lived in a state of what some scholars have called a
“benign indeterminacy.”15
So, then in the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court
held that the government could not get a prior restraint on the
publication of very sensitive material, historical materials about
the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.16 But if you read that
opinion closely, it's not hard to find a majority of the justices, if
10

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528–35 (2001).
Id. at 517–19.
12
Id. at 517.
13
Id.
14
561 U.S. 1 (2010).
15
See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmitt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936 (1973) (“We have lived since World
War I in a state of benign indeterminacy about the rules of law governing defense
secrets.”).
16
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
11
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you add up the votes, left open the possibility that subsequent
criminal prosecution would be permissible. So, since that time,
we haven't had efforts to prosecute the press. The closest we had
was the prosecution of two lobbyists from the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in the Eastern District of
Virginia.17 And this prosecution ended up getting dropped after
some unfavorable opinions for the government.18 Those lobbyists
had received information from a Department of Defense
source,19 and, although they were lobbyists and not the press,
they were similar to the press in that they were third parties. In
other words, they were not people who had obtained the
information through their jobs or through contracts and then
revealed it directly––they had obtained it from someone else.
So, I said that I wanted to use this prosecution to think
about a lot of issues, and I do regard these issues as fundamental
to the successful operation of our democracy. Number One, this
prosecution and the facts underlying it reveal the unbelievable
state of our classification system. Overclassification is rampant.
The sheer volume of secrets that the United States keeps is mind
boggling. And now, we have a volume of leaks that are possible
with technology, flash drives, and so on that were not possibly
contemplated before. We also have the ease of leaks that we
never had before.
On the one hand, the security of our republic could be
threatened. And I do want to give credence to the national
security concerns that this prosecution reveals. You know, the
idea that people should have carte blanche freedom to leak and
publish national security secrets does raise some serious national
security concerns. I think everyone agrees that there are some
national security secrets that must remain secret. Some of the
focus of the indictment is the identity of informants in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and protecting their security is a really big deal.
There are, of course, movements of ships and troops, secret
communication methods, that sort of thing, codes. We know that
there is clearly protected information that we need to keep secret.
So, the ease of leaks and the volume of leaks is disconcerting.
But, at the same time, it can't be that everything that is classified
17

Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, U.S. to Drop Spy Case Against Pro-Israel Lobbyists,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/politics/02aipac.html.
18
See id.
19
See id.
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needs to be classified. There is grave concern––and history bears
this out––that the government has used and misused the
classification system to hide government wrongdoing. So, it's
hard to know what our leadership is doing in our names if we
don't have access to this information.
The other point is that the indictment rests in large part,
as I said, on the various counts in the Espionage Act.20 The
Espionage Act itself is written in broad, capacious terms. I know
some of our panelists have testified before Congress, particularly
Steve Vladeck, and in those hearings, when asked, the
government officials typically will say, “you know, we're good.
We like the Espionage Act the way it is,” because the Espionage
Act and a number of other laws that are on the books basically
allow the government real authority to prosecute anyone they
would want if they want to go after someone. These problems
with the Espionage Act are really well known. As Steve Vladeck
said in a recent podcast, “let me get out my dead horse and beat
it,” when talking about how the Espionage Act needs to be
rewritten.21 But this prosecution, if it goes forward, is going to
highlight more of these problems.
Another point this prosecution highlights is the need for
us to come to grips with the importance of transparency. I want
to mention specifically the work of David Pozen, who's on the
first panel and who has been writing a lot about transparency and
how we should think about the importance of transparency.22 As
he's rightly mentioned, transparency for transparency’s sake
20

See Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 5.
Stephen Vladeck is the Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts at the
University of Texas School of Law and a nationally recognized expert on national
security. Stephen I. Vladeck, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW,
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/stephen-i-vladeck (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
Professor Vladeck is also the co-host of The National Security Law Podcast, “a weekly
review of the latest legal controversies associated with the U.S. government’s
national security activities and institutions.” THE NAT’L SEC. L. PODCAST,
https://www.nationalsecuritylawpodcast.com/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
Professor Vladeck was a panelist at First Amendment Law Review’s 2021 Symposium
on National Security, Whistleblowers, and the First Amendment. Panel One, supra
note 2.
22
David Pozen is the Vice Dean for Intellectual Life and Charles Keller Beekman
Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and a nationally recognized expert on
constitutional law and information law. David Pozen, COLUM. L. SCH.,
https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/david-pozen (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
Professor Pozen has written extensively on government secrets and access to
information. Id. Professor Pozen was a panelist at First Amendment Law Review’s 2021
Symposium on National Security, Whistleblowers, and the First Amendment. Panel
One, supra note 2.
21
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cannot be our goal. We have to think more purposefully about
why we want transparency. What is the underlying purpose?
What do we hope to achieve? As I mentioned, there could be
some real harms with complete transparency. How much should
we know? How much do we need to know? And it may be that
just having everything laid bare is not actually going to help our
democracy. In fact, one of the biggest problems with the volume
of secrets these days is that it's very hard to process if you have
these thousands and thousands of pages. The average person
doesn't have time to go through that, and trying to figure out
what is important and what's not important can really get lost in
the shuffle. So, we need to be thinking clearly about what we
would need to know and what, maybe, we can continue to keep
secret.
One of the problems we see with all these leak
prosecutions and the Assange prosecution is that, because our
classification system is so broken, we have come to rely on
leakers and the publication of leaked information by the press in
order to reform our democracy. And I think most people have
said it's a terrible system, but it's the best that we’ve got.
Nevertheless, it illustrates that we need to continue the battle to
reform the system. The systems we have set up in place are not
working particularly well. In the last four years, we have seen
some of the problems with our inspectors general and how
they've been attacked, particularly by President Trump, and the
failure, the utter failure, of Congress to be a meaningful check on
the executive branch. I'll just nod to Heidi Kitrosser’s amazing
work in this area, separation of powers, to illustrate some of the
issues that we have there.23
Most importantly, the Assange prosecution highlights my
concerns about the press. When announcing the Assange
indictment, DOJ National Security Division Team Chief John
Demers said Assange is “no journalist.”24 Well, what did that
mean? I'm sure he was trying to assure everyone they’re not
23

Heidi Kitrosser is the Robins Kaplan Professor of Law at the University of
Minnesota Law School and the Newton N. Minow Visiting Professor of Law at the
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Heidi Kitrosser, NW. PRITZKER SCH. OF LAW,
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/HeidiKitrosser/ (last visited
Apr. 21, 2021). Professor Kitrosser is a leading expert on federal government secrecy,
and her scholarship focuses on leak prosecutions, government whistleblowers,
government secrecy, and separation of powers. Id. Professor Kitrosser was a panelist
at First Amendment Law Review’s 2021 Symposium on National Security,
Whistleblowers, and the First Amendment. Panel Two, supra note 3.
24
Savage, supra note 4.
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going after the press. But that's a meaningless assurance. In this
country, we don't credential our journalists and, perhaps more
importantly, our First Amendment protections do not belong
exclusively to journalists. And they have no special protections
under the First Amendment. Depending on, or relying on,
prosecutors and then, ultimately, members of the jury to
determine who is a journalist is no way to protect our
democracy. We have seen that the norms that govern our society
and our democracy are under attack. And one of the things that
we have depended on for the last two centuries is that the press
is given this protection, but it's not by law. It's a norm.
It’s this benign indeterminacy, in part, but it's also a much
bigger norm that the press plays an important role in our society.
And I'll point to something that's related, which is the rules that
govern the reporter's privilege. So, there is no federal reporter's
privilege, and, instead, the attorney general's office has
guidelines that restrict subpoenas to the press to reveal their
sources or to require them to turn over work product.25 I do think
one miracle of the Trump administration is that we didn't see
more subpoenas to the press, given that it is only norms and not
law that protect the press from having to turn over their source
identity and their work product. But I fear for the future. I'm
hopeful, under President Biden, that the protection of the press
will continue. But I think we all know Biden is in office four
years, and what happens after that?
We need to be thinking in the long term, and relying on
the norms is particularly problematic when the public at large
doesn't like the press. So, it's not just that we have to rely on the
prosecutors, but we have a much bigger societal problem where
the press is now not sympathetic. I feel like the Assange
prosecution is part and parcel of this attack on the press. Assange
is not a sympathetic character to most Americans. You will find
people who trumpet him as a brave journalist exposing
wrongdoing, but, for the most part, I think most Americans are
not superfans of him. He's also not an American, so that doesn't
help his cause. And I fear that this kind of case could make some
bad law for the press in general. So, what I would say going

25

Linda Moon, Bruce D. Brown & Gabe Rottman, New DOJ reports provide detail on
use of law enforcement tools against the news media, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.rcfp.org/new-doj-reports-provide-detail-use-lawenforcement-tools-against-new/.
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forward is that we should see this as a call to action. We need to
rehabilitate the press in the public's eye.
I always ask my students, where do you get your news
and what do you think about the news media? And, of course,
none of them read papers anymore. They get a lot of their news
through social media. But, most disturbingly, last year I think it
was the first time my students, most of the class, said they didn't
know what was true or false anymore. They didn't know who to
trust. My heart broke right there on the spot. So, we need to
commit ourselves to finding out what the truth is and establishing
the public's trust in our institutions. So, in other words, although
the Biden administration may decide to drop the Assange
prosecution, this prosecution itself illustrates the urgency of
rehabilitating the press.
The role of the press in this country is essential. It's known
as the Fourth Estate for a reason. It provides an essential check
on our government. Is it perfect? No. But the role of the press is
essential. Rehabilitating the press will not be easy, but this is
important work that needs to be done. Along the way, all of us
here––and I'm pointing to you students too, not just the esteemed
scholars––we need to continue the good fight against excessive
government secrecy, work to protect the reporter's privilege, and
work to reform and revise the laws that govern the publication of
national security information. We need to fight for the protection
of leakers who reveal information that's important for the public's
interest. And, so, this is my call to action.
We have so many things we need to do in this country.
Again, I think the January sixth attacks really brought to light for
all of us the need to engage in so many ways. But I urge you all,
no matter what your cause is––if it's not national security,
perhaps it's racial justice, it could be any number of topics––to
think about the role of the press in allowing us to come to a
national consensus on what is truth. Because some things are
true, and some things aren't true. And getting that information is
essential for a democracy to work effectively.

